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"ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH, DEAR
FRIENDS, ONCE MORE': A CALL TO
RE-EVALUATE THE FELONY-MURDER
DOCTRINE IN WISCONSIN IN THE
WAKE OF STATE v OIMEN AND
STATE v. RIVERA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Archaic methodologies are seldom reinvigorated in America's increasingly overwhelmed criminal justice system. In Wisconsin, however,
the state supreme court recently expanded the scope of a criminal statute that traces its roots back to the sixteenth century English common
law.2 Wisconsin Statutes Section 940.03,3 (the felony-murder statute) or
its predecessors have remained in force despite repeated attempts to
abolish them from the state's criminal code. Critics have continually battered the felony-murder doctrine since the Wisconsin Legislature began
to revise the state's criminal code in 1956. 4 After each of these analytical
assaults on felony murder, however, the doctrine's political defenders
rebuked the critics, and the statute remained in force. 5
The last attempt to abolish the doctrine began innocuously in 1982
when the Wisconsin Judicial Council formed its Special Committee on
Homicide and Lesser-Included Offenses ("Special Committee"). 6 The
1. WuL.iAM SHAKESPEARE, King Henry the Fifth, in THE CoMPLETE WoRKs OF WmLiAM
SHAKESPEARE

458, 468 (Chancellor Press ed. 1987).

2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. The statute reads:
940.03 Felony murder
Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to
commit a crime specified in sec. 940.225(1) or (2)(a), 943.02, 943.10(2) or 943.32(2) may
be imprisoned for not more than 20 years in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law for that crime or attempt.
WIs. STAT. § 940.03 (1991-92).
4. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
5. See infra part II.B.
6. The Special Committee consisted of a distinguished panel of academics, judges, district
attorneys, and criminal defense attorneys. The committee originally included Professor Walter Dickey, Chair;, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson; Judge Michael J.
Barron; Asst. Atty. Gen. David J. Becker; William U. Burke; William M. Coffey; Francis R.
Croak; Jerome L. Fox; State Sen. (now former Attorney General) Donald Hanaway; Asst.
Dist. Atty. (now Judge) Michael Malmstadt; Judge Gordon Myse; Orlan L. Prestegard; Prof.
Frank J. Remington; Asst. Pub. Def. (now Judge) Michael J. Rosborough; State Rep. James A.
Rutkowski; Janet Schipper;, and Prof. David E. Schultz. The committee reporter (now Executive Secretary of the Wisconsin Judicial Council) was James L. Fullin, Jr. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 1, 1 (Sept.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:785

Special Committee was originally charged with clarifying7 the criminal
code's homicide provisions that had last seen major revision in 1956.8
Clarification soon turned to revision as the committee members realized
"the confused state of the [homicide] law" in Wisconsin. 9 The final recommendations of the committee formed the basis of the Wisconsin Legislature's revision of the homicide code that became effective on January
1, 1989.10 In this attempt to modernize and clarify the homicide statutes,
however, the Special Committee and the legislature actually opened a
breach in the historical and legal underpinnings of Wisconsin's felonymurder statute. The discussion which follows posits that this breach and
the recent case law interpreting the new statute should be a signal to the
legislature to once again evaluate whether the felony-murder doctrine
should have a place in the modem criminal code.
In Part II, this Comment will chronicle the evolution of Wisconsin's
felony-murder statute, from its common-law roots to its present incarnation under Wisconsin Statutes Section 940.03.11 Part III will focus on a
10, 1982) (unpublished, summaries of proceedings and minutes of meetings of the Judicial
Council and the Homicide Law Committee are contained in the three volume set, WISCONSIN
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S REVISION OF WISCONSIN HOMICIDE STATUTES 19821987, available at the Wisconsin State Law Library; also available at the Marquette University
Law School library with other documents collected from the 1988 revision in two volume set,
1988 HoMIcIDE REVISION: WISCONSIN JUDICIAL COUNCIL & SPECIAL COMMrrTEE NOTES &
DocUMEmrs [hereinafter HOMICIDE REVISION]); see also Walter Dickey et al., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1323, 1326
n.7.
7. At the first meeting of the Special Committee its chairperson, Walter Dickey, gave a
synopsis of why the Judicial Council formed the Committee:
He noted that the Committee's charge was somewhat general. Even a casual reading of the present Wisconsin Statutes indicates a lack of clarity. This has resulted in a
continuing development of the law of homicide through judicial interpretation ....
Lack of statutory clarity has also bedeviled the Jury Instructions Committee, which
attempts to formulate explanations of the law understandable by the average juror.
Chairman Dickey hoped that the Committee could work together and come to some
agreement about what changes would clarify this situation.
Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 1, 1 (Sept. 10, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIDE REVIsION, supra note 6).

8. For an excellent synopsis of the 1956 Criminal Code revision and all of the problems
encountered with the proposed changes to the homicide statutes, see William A. Platz, The
Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350.
9. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1326. "At times, the committee concluded that it must
recommend what the law ought to be because of the conflicting and ambiguous interpretations
of what the law was." Id.
10. For an extensive discussion of the entire homicide revision by three prominent members of the Special Committee (Professor Walter Dickey, Professor David Schultz, and James
Fullin, Jr.), see generally Dickey et al., supra note 6.
11. See supra note 3.
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particularly vexing problem that states face when interpreting their felony-murder statutes: How far does criminal liability extend when a
death is caused in the commission of a felony by someone other than the
defendant? This question was only recently answered by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in State v. Oimen12 and State v. Rivera.1 3 The expansive
reading the court gave to Section 940.03 in these cases makes a clear
break with the historical development of the felony-murder doctrine in
Wisconsin. This break with the past may give impetus to an eventual
elimination of the felony-murder doctrine in this state. Accordingly,
Part IV analyzes the justifications and criticisms of retaining the felonymurder doctrine in Wisconsin in the aftermath of Oimen and Rivera and
concludes with a call to the Wisconsin Legislature to re-evaluate the necessity of Section 940.03.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF FELONY MURDER IN WISCONSIN

Like many aspects of the present legal system in Wisconsin, the felony-murder doctrine (or felony-murder rule) had its genesis in the common law. Therefore, before one can chronicle the doctrine's further
development in this state, it is first necessary to discuss the origins of
felony murder under the English common law and its subsequent adoption in early American law. 4
A.

Felony Murder Under the Common Law

Felony murder in its earliest incarnations'5 under English common
law provided that one who, in the commission of a felony, caused the
12. 184 Wis. 2d 423, 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994).
13. 184 Wis. 2d 485, 516 N.W.2d 391 (1994).
14. For a general history of the felony-murder doctrine at common law see Roy MoRELAN, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 42-54 (1952).
15. The origins of the felony-murder doctrine remain in dispute. The first formal statement of the rule is often cited as Lord Dacres' case, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535); however,
others point to Mansell & Herbert'scase, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1558). People v. Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304, 307-08 (Mich. 1980). Whatever its true genesis, the early formulations of the
doctrine gained prominence with Sir Edward Coke's statement of the felony-murder rule in
1797:
"If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A. meaning to steale a deere in the park of
B., shooteth at the deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a
bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawfull, although A. had no intent to hurt
the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B. the owner of the park had shot at his own deer,
and without any ill intent had killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been
homicide by misadventure, and no felony.
"So if one shoot at any wild fowle upon a tree, and the arrow killeth any reasonable
creature afar off, without any evill intent in him, this is per infortunium [misadventure]:
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death of another person was guilty of murder.' 6 Because the rule operated under strict liability, the defendant's intent to cause the death or the
likelihood that death could result from the commission of the felony
made no difference. 7 All that was needed for the prosecution to prove
guilt was the commission or attempted commission of a felony that resulted in a death.' 8
It is important to note that at the time the doctrine originated there
were very few crimes classified as felonies, 19 and all of these were capital
crimes.20 Thus, "it made no difference whether a felon was executed for
one felony or another."'" Therefore, the harsh nature of the rule was
curtailed by the fact that only the most egregious crimes carried with
for it was not unlawful to shoot at the wilde fowle: but if he had shot at a cock or hen,
or any tame fowle of another mans, and the arrow by mischance had killed a man, this
had been murder, for the act was unlawfull."
Id. at 308-09 (quoting EDWARD CoKE, THE THkn PART OF THE INsTrrtrrEs OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 56 (London, E & R Brooke 1797). Professor George Fletcher suggests that "[t]he
sources of the rule are not judicial decisions but [actually] scholarly commentaries." George
P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder,12 Sw. U. L. REv. 413, 421 (1980). Fletcher also

posits that it was not until 1762 that the formal statement of felony murder took hold. He
attributes this to Sir Michael Foster's reconstruction of the law of homicide in Discourse of
Homicide. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 281-82 (1978) (citing MICHAEL
FOSTER, Discourse I of Homicide, in CRowN LAW 255, 258 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762)).
For Foster's description of felony murder see infra note 16. While its origins may remain
unclear, there is no dispute that by the 18th century the doctrine was in full force in English
courts and thus carried over to the American colonies. FLETCHER, supra, at 283.
16. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. Scorr JR., SuSTA WE CIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at
206 (2d ed. 1986). The classic illustration of felony murder at common law is:
A. shooteth at the poultry of B., and by accident killeth a man; if his intention was to
steal the poultry, which must be collected from the circumstances, it will be murder by
reason of that felonious intent; but if it was done wantonly and without that intention it
will be barely manslaughter.
Frederick J. Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 51, 51 (1956)
(quoting FOSTER, supra note 15, at 258-59).
17. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., The Common Law, in THE COMMON LAW & OTHER WRITINGs 1, 57-58 (The Legal Classics Library ed. 1982).
18. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 413. One commentator has noted that "[t]he phrase used
in English cases and by English commentators, 'constructive murder,' captures the essence of
this rule." Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibilityfor the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 50, 59 (1956).
19. 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 16, at 208. The felonies at common law were: rape,
sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, and larceny. Id.
20. Frederick C. Moesel, Jr., Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TErm,. L.Q. 453, 454
(1955).
21. Id. (citing Powers v. Commonwealth, 61 S.W. 735 (1901)). One commentator suggests
a "more rational basis" for the doctrine based on the English case Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng.
Rep. 129 (Assizes 1862):
The annotator of the case points out that a man can resist the perpetration of a felony
by force even to the extent of killing the felon, and, therefore, if a person is engaged in
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them the possibility of the felony-murder penalty. Nonetheless, the
harshness of the rule led to much criticism among legal scholars, particularly in the last forty years as states began to abolish the common law
and codify their criminal codes. 2
Because all states have replaced the criminal common law with statutory codes, these jurisdictions now face the difficult task of justifying a
doctrine which no longer comports with modem theories of criminal
law.23 Most jurisdictions (including Wisconsin) classify homicide offenses and penalties to reflect a theory of proportionality to the severity
of the crime.' Thus, one of the factual predicates of the original docthe commission of a felony for which he can be lawfully killed, the presumption is that
the felon would kill if necessary and such implied intent is sufficient to make it murder.
Id.
22. For a sampling of this criticism, see Fletcher, supra note 15; James J. Hippard Sr., The
Unconstitutionalityof CriminalLiability Without Fault.- An Argument for a ConstitutionalDoctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. Rv. 1039 (1973); Maynard E. Pirsig, ProposedRevision of the
Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 MINN. L. Rnv. 417, 426-29 (1963); Ludwig, supra note 13;
Jeanne Hall Seibold, Note, The Felony-MurderRule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine,23 CATH.
LAW. 133 (1978); Note, Recent Cases, 71 HARV. L. Rv. 1565, 1565-66 (1958).
23. See 8 JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. OF THE AMERICAN LAW INST.,
THE PROBLEM OF PUNIS[ING HOMICIDE 29 (1962); see also Jo Anne C. Adlerstein, FelonyMurder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. ClUM. L. 249, 267 (1975-76). Fletcher discusses
whether felony-murder evinces one of two modes of "unrefined ways of thinking about criminal responsibility." Fletcher, supra note 15, at 426. The first is the theory of "tainting" which
results from the causation of a death, regardless of the actor's culpability.
In thirteenth-century England, the assumption was that if one person caused the
death of another, the killing itself upset the natural order; some response was necessary
to expiate the killing and thus to expunge the taint....
The model of taint and expiation haunts the way our courts think about criminal
homicide. The felon must answer for a human death for no reason other than that he
or his accomplice causes it. The felon is tainted by causing and the state responds by
seeking expiation. It is important to distinguish expiating the taint of killing from justly
punishing for faultfully causing death. The taint arises regardless of fault or blame;
punishment is just only so far as it is proportional to fault. The notion of expiating a
taint reflects a conception of the world that, if brought to consciousness, most lawyers
would vehemently reject. Yet the notion of tainting might be one of the subconscious
props for the contemporary persistence of the felony-murder rule.
Id. The other mode of rationale is that someone who:
engages in a felony lowers the threshold of moral responsibility for the resulting death.
If there is a principle behind this way of thinking, it is that a wrongdoer must run the
risk that things will turn out worse than she expects.... If the act is wrong, even as the
defendant conceives the facts to be, then she presumably has no grounds for complaining if the facts turn out to be worse than she expects.... If wrongdoing justifies
disregarding mistakes about aggravating circumstances, then felonious wrongdoing can
justify disregarding whether the deadly outcome of the felony is accidental or culpable.
Id. at 427 (citations omitted).
24. See Wis. STAT. § 940.01-10, -12 (1991-92). Classification of crimes into degrees of
severity accomplishes the societal goal of proportionality between the severity of the crime
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trine-that all felonies carried the same penalty-no longer exists. It is
no surprise, then, that many jurisdictions have modified, limited, or abolished the felony-murder rule as a component of their criminal codes.25
Over the years jurisdictions have developed a variety of methods to
limit the harsh effects2 6 of the felony-murder rule. English courts began
to limit the applicability of the doctrine early in its history.27 This coinand the resulting punishment. Proportionality has long been a hallmark of Classical Liberal
philosophy. See generally JEPEMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 TiM WoRKs OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 399-402 (John Bowring ed., limited ed. 1962) (1838-43); MoNTEsouIEu, De Esprit des Lois, in THm POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTEsOUIEu 167 (Melvin Richter
ed. & trans., 1977).25. See generally Adlerstein, supra note 23. Three states have abolished the rule: two by
statute, Hawaii and Kentucky; and one by judicial decision, Michigan. HAw. REv. STAT.
§§ 707-711 (1972), KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Baldwin 1985), and People v. Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304, 328-29 (Mich. 1980); see also Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The FelonyMurder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads,70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 446 n.6
(1985); Note, Felony Murder:A Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1918, 1918
n.2 (1986) [hereinafter Tort Law]. One state, Ohio, has incorporated felony murder into its
involuntary manslaughter statute, thereby effectively eliminating it. Roth & Sundby, supra,at
n.7; Tort Law, supra, at 1918 n.2.
It is also interesting to note that the felony-murder rule is no longer in effect in its birthplace jurisdiction. The English Parliament abolished it in 1957:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the
killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the
course or furtherance of another offence.
English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 1(1) (Eng.).
26. See, e.g., RoLLIN M. PERINs & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMNAL LAW 136 (3d ed.
1982).
27. Moesel, supra note 20, at 455; see also 2 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 16, at 207.
Judge James Fitzjames Stephen was particularly hostile to the Foster reformulation of the
felony-murder doctrine, and this may have led to the English courts restraint in applying it.
FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 283; see 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HiSTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 75 (London, MacMillan 1883). Stephen's discontent with the early formulations
of the felony-murder rule is extremely important because he presided as trial judge in Regina
v. Sern, 16 Cox Crim. Cases. 311,313 (Central Crim. Ct. 1887), which is considered the birthplace of the modem felony-murder rule. FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 283. Sern6 is important
in Wisconsin law because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals declared that Sern6 was the case
upon which the Wisconsin common law crime of felony murder had developed. State v.
Noren, 125 Wis. 2d 204, 209, 371 N.W.2d 381,384 (Ct. App. 1985); see infra notes 103-04 and
accompanying text.
Stephen's Sernd test is:
In my opinion the definition of the law which makes it murder to kill by an act done in
the commission of a felony might and ought to be narrowed ..... I think that, instead
of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death
amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be dangerous
to life, and likely in itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony
which caused death, should be murder.
Sern, 16 Cox. Crim. Cases at 313.
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cided with the courts' general alleviation of the entire original punishment scheme for the common-law crime of murder.28 The limits the
English courts placed on felony murder were two-fold; they required
either: (1) "that the defendant's conduct in committing the felony involve[d] an act of violence in carrying out a felony of violence, '29 or (2)
"that the death be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's conduct in committing the felony."30
American legislatures and courts, however, have remained
remarkedly varied in their approaches to the felony-murder doctrine.
Although some states retain the language of the original common-law
statement of the rule, in practice they limit the applicability to the two
situations listed above. 31 Other states specifically limit the doctrine to a
certain set of inherently dangerous felonies. 32 Still others require that
the death caused be33 a "'natural and probable consequence' of the defendant's conduct.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code (the "Code") originally would
have eliminated the rule, but the realization that it would be politically
difficult to do so led them to include the doctrine, albeit in a much
more restricted form.35 Nonetheless, only New Hampshire followed the
example of the Code's felony-murder provision when it rewrote its crim28. Moesel, supra note 20, at 455.
29. 2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, at 207 (citing Sern6, 16 Cox Crim. Cases at 311).
30. Id. (citing Regina v. Horsey, 176 ENG. REP'. 129 (Assizes 1862)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 208-11; see also Adlerstein, supra note 23, at 251-53; Seibold, supra note 22, at
137-41.
33. 2 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 16, at 214; see also Adlerstein, supra note 23, at 253.
34. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of CriminalLaw in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. R~v. 1425, 1446 (1968); see also Adlerstein, supra note 23, at 260-61.
35. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 413-15; Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 471-78; see
also Joshua Dressier, UNDERsTANDING CuvANA. LAw 486 (1987). The MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2(1)(b) reads:
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder
when:
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is
engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse
by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b). The Code, therefore, creates a presumption that the defendant carried the required mens rea of recklessness and extreme indifference during the
commission or attempted commission of one of the enumerated offenses. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2(1)(b) cmt. 6 at 29 (1980 ed.).
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inal statutes. 6 In fact, the Code's felony-murder provision is one of its
least followed recommendations.37
As can be seen from the above discussion, the original common-law
description of felony murder has diverged into a multitude of formulations. Each of these variations attempts to mollify the absolute liability
created under the common law. To understand why each jurisdiction
developed its own distinct felony-murder statute, it is necessary to trace
the historical development of the doctrine in that state. Therefore, the
next section will chronicle the evolution of felony murder in Wisconsin
from its genesis to its current form.
B. Felony Murder in Wisconsin from Common Law to the
1988 Revision

1. Early Statutory Definitions
The felony-murder doctrine has existed in Wisconsin in one form or
another since the state's early days as a federal territory. Like most
other American jurisdictions, the doctrine was derived from the common-law definition of murder.3 8 The Wisconsin territorial statutes in
1839 provide an early codification of this common-law description: "That
every person who shall commit the
crime of murder, shall suffer the pun'3 9
ishment of death for the same.
Once Wisconsin achieved statehood, early statutory enactments
broke this common-law crime into a system of three degrees of mur36. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 473 n.152.
37. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 415.
38. Hogan v. State, 36 Wis. 226, 238 (1874). The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hogan
stated:
At common law, there were two crimes of homicide only, murder and manslaughter. Murder was the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, express or implied; manslaughter was the unlawful killing, without malice, express or
implied. But homicide was sometimes murder by malice imputed by law to the conditions under which it was committed.
The terms, express or implied, as applied to malice aforethought, led to some confusion in the books. Express malice was sometimes considered as malice positively appearing; sometimes as actual malice, whether positively or inferentially appearing.
Implied malice was sometimes considered as malice, not positively, but inferentially
appearing sometimes as malice not at all appearing, but imputed by law: constructive
malice. This was not only confusion of terms, but led to confusion of guilt, leaving the
distinction between murder and manslaughter sometimes doubtful.
Id.; see also In re Carlson, 176 Wis. 538,542-46, Exparte Carlson, 186 N.W. 722,723-24 (1922);
1 THOMAS J. HAMMER &

ROBERT

D. DONOHOO,

219-20 (1988).
39. STATUTES OF THE TERRITORY
DONOHOO, supra note 38, at 219-20.

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW IN WISCONSIN

OF WISCONSIN §

1, at 347 (1839); see also 1

HAMMER

&
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der,40 with third-degree murder constituting felony murder.41 For example, the 1849 statutes provided that the killing of a human being "[w]hen
perpetrated without any design to effect the death, by a person engaged
in the commission of any felony shall be murder in the third degree, and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than
fourteen years nor less than seven years."'4 The underlying felony was
defined as "an offense for which the offender, on conviction,
shall be
43
liable to be punished by imprisonment in a state prison.
This classification of murder into three degrees also distinguished between murder with express malice and murder with implied malice. 44
Third-degree murder fell into the latter classification with the malice for
the killing imputed from the commission of the underlying felony.45 In
order for the malice to attach, this felony needed an "intimate relation
and close connection with the killing, and [could not] be separate, distinct and independent from it."' If the felony was itself "dangerous to
life, the killing must be naturally consequent to the felony."'4 7
The connection between the commission of the felony by the defendant and murder was further delineated in Hoffman v. State.4 8 In Hoffman, the defendant was convicted of third-degree murder after engaging
in a felonious assault on one patron of a tavern and then shortly after
unintentionally killing another patron.49 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin overturned his conviction, concluding that there was no legal rela40. Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516,519, 1 N.W. 278,279 (1879). "The offense of murder in
the three degrees, as defined by our statute.., is but the adoption or introduction into the
statute, of the common law description of the crime." Id. at 519, 1 N.W. at 280 (citing People
v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159 (1834)).
41. REv. STAT. oF Wis. cl. 133, § 2 (1849).
42. Id.
43. State v. Hammond, 35 Wis. 315, 318 (1874).
44. Pliemling,46 Wis. at 519, 1 N.W. at 279.
It is sometimes stated that the object of this classification is to make a distinction between murder with express malice and murder with implied malice. In the killing without the design to effect death, there can be no actual malice or intention in the act
itself; and in murder in the third degree such malice and felonious intent, necessary to
make it murder, is derived from the felony by the commission of which, or in the commission of which, the killing happens.
Id. at 519, 1 N.W. at 280; see also Hogan, 36 Wis. at 226, 238.
45. Pliemling,46 Wis. at 519, 1 N.W. at 279.

46. Id. at 521, 1 N.W. at 281.
47. Id. For further discussion of felonies that are dangerous to life see 2
Scorr, supra note 16, at 208-10.
48. 88 Wis. 166, 59 N.W. 588 (1894).

49. Id-at 167-68, 59 N.W. at 589.
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tionship between the two acts." In so doing, the court established a
necessary causal link between the felony and the death:
There must be such a legal relation between the two that it can be
said that the killing occurred by reason and as part of the felony,
or, as in this case, that the killing occurred before the assault...
was at an end; so that the assault had a legal relation to the killing, and was concurrent with,5 1in part at least, and a part of, it, in
an actual and material sense.
From these early statutes and their immediate successors the felonymurder doctrine remained much the same until the major revision of
Wisconsin's criminal code became effective in 1956.52 The Wisconsin
Legislative Council initiated the revision in 1949 and, after several partial drafts, a complete criminal code was introduced to the legislature in
February 1953. 51 The proposed code repealed the felony-murder statute,5 4 but this change had many opponents:
[T]he... code dropped the felony-murder... [concept] on the
ground that punishing a [person] for unintended consequences
had little place in a modern system of criminal law. But the critics
of the 1953 code insisted on reestablishing felony-murder,
although yielding to the extent of agreeing to treat the death as an
aggravating factor in the principal felony.5'
50. Id. at 179, 59 N.W. at 592-93.
It is not sufficient that the plaintiff in error killed Herzog [the victim]; but, in order to
render him guilty of murder in the third degree, at the time the homicide was committed it was requisite that he should have been engaged in an assault on Robert Risto
[the victim of the original assault] with intent to do great bodily harm. This might occur
in various ways, as if, during the assault, Herzog had come between the parties, and
received a mortal blow or wound, intended for or aimed at Risto, or he had been intentionally stricken down by a mortal blow or wound in an attempt to reach Risto.
Id. at 178, 59 N.W. at 592.
51. Id. at 179, 59 N.W. at 592-93.
52. 1 HAMMER & DoNoHoo, supra note 38, at 219-20.
53. Platz, supra note 8, at 351-52.
54. 5 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE 265 (1953).
55. Platz, supra note 8, at 357 (footnotes omitted). The specific reasons for the retention
of the felony-murder doctrine in the 1955 revision are difficult to ascertain beyond the usual
mention of the politically unpalatable nature of removing any crime from the code. However,
one set of commentators has provided some insight:
Professor Frank Remington, who participated in development of the revised criminal
code, recalls that the late Judge Herbert Steffes was particularly influential in the decision to retain felony murder. The primary reason for retaining the offense was that its
penalty, which was less than that for second-degree murder, provided an alternative
charge which might be useful in plea bargaining.
Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1366.
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Thus, the 1955 enactment, while retaining felony murder,56 dropped the
previous statutory language that the murder be committed "without any
design to effect death. '57 Additionally, following similar changes in
other jurisdictions,5" the new statute included the new condition that the
consequence of the commission of or
death be a "natural and probable
59
attempt to commit the felony."1
In 1977, Wisconsin legislators once again attempted to repeal the felony-murder statute; this time the move was made during the legislature's
reclassification of the penalties for criminal code offenses. 0 As in the
56. While the code retained felony murder under the auspices of third-degree murder,
felony murder was no longer a independent crime, but an aggravation of the underlying felony, the maximum penalty of which was increased by 15 years. Platz, supra note 8, at 370.
57. See Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (1955).
58. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1365.
59. The full statute provided:
940.03 Third-degree Murder. Whoever in the course of committing or attempting to
commit a felony causes the death of another human being as a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of or attempt to commit the felony, may be imprisoned
not more than 15 years in excess of the maximum provided by law for the felony.
VIs. STAT § 940.03 (1955).

One commentator noted that the 1955 felony-murder statute appeared to be a hybrid between the traditional criminal law definition of felony murder and its close cousin in civil law
jurisdictions which treats the killing in the course of another crime as a penalty-enhancer to
the underlying crime.
The statute in Wisconsin, which is somewhat unique, appears to be a "cross" between the approach of the common law and the civil law. Under the Wisconsin statute,
it is murder in the third degree when a person causes the death of another as a natural
and probable consequence of the commission of or attempt to commit a felony; and the
offender "may be imprisoned not more than 15 years in excess of the maximum provided by law for the felony." It resembles common law felony-murder because the
offense is called 'murder' and because it involves an "unintended" homicide. At the
same time, it closely resembles the civil law doctrine because the basis for punishment
is the "felony", i.e., the punishment for the felony may be increased by 15 years because it resulted in the commission of a homicide.
E. ToRcA, WHA.RTON'S CRimaNAL LAW 205 (14th ed. 1979).
2 CHs
60. 1 HAMMER & DONOHOO, supra note 38, at 220. The reasons for this renewed attempt
to repeal the felony-murder statute were listed in the legislative record:
The bill proposing the repeal of third-degree felony-murder, Senate Bill 14, section 28,
1977 S.B., included a note explaining that third-degree felony-murder was superfluous
because a person who caused another's death in the course of committing a felony
could be convicted under one of the other homicide statutes. The proponents explained
the proposed repeal as follows:
"Present law already permits the sentencing of offenders on multiple counts for different crimes arising from the same act. For example, a person committing homicide while
committing a robbery can be sentenced to concurrent or consecutive terms for both
robbery and homicide. Therefore, the third degree murder statute is unnecessary."
State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 144,330 N.W.2d 564,568-69 (1983)(quoting S. 14, 1977 Leg.

Sess. § 28.).
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past, this attempt failed; however, the legislature did abolish felony murder as a separate
offense and included it as one variation of second-de61
gree murder.
Although there were two major revisions of the felony-murder statute within two decades, it is surprising that there is little case law interpreting the precise language of the statute. The four cases that follow,
however, may provide insight into the evolving implementation of this
common-law derived doctrine in a legal world increasingly hostile to its
validity.
2. Wisconsin Case Law Interpretations of Felony Murder
In Brook v. State,6" the issue was whether a trial court erred when it
denied a defendant's request to instruct the jury with alternative instructions for second-degree murder, third-degree murder, or manslaughter.63
The defendant and his brother burglarized a school and left the scene in
the defendant's car.64 Shortly after leaving the scene, they were detained by a police officer investigating the dangling front license plate on
the defendant's car.65 The police officer neither had knowledge of the
burglary nor suspected the defendant's involvement in a felony.66 The
defendants shot and killed the officer and disposed of the squad car and
the body. 67 The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed this conviction contending that the officer's death occurred while
the defendant was engaged in an escape after the burglary. 68 For this
reason the defendant contended the jury should have been given instructions for third-degree murder since the death was in actuality a felony
murder.69
61. There is no official record as to why felony murder was amended to the second-degree
murder statute. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 144, 330 N.W.2d at 569. The new statute provided:
940.02 Second-degree Murder. Whoever causes the death of another human being
under either of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class B felony:
(1) By conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life; or
(2) As a natural and probable consequence of the commission of or attempt to
commit a felony.
Wis. STAT. § 940.02 (1977).
62. 21 Wis. 2d 32, 123 N.W.2d 535 (1963).
63. Id. at 40, 123 N.W.2d at 539.
64. Id. at 35, 123 N.W.2d at 537.
65. Id.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

41, 123 N.W.2d at 539.
36-37, 123 N.W.2d at 537.
41, 123 N.W.2d at 539.
40-41, 123 N.W.2d at 539.
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The supreme court rejected this argument by declaring that even if
the facts as given by the defendant were truthful, the death would still
not be a felony murder.70 Further, the court stated that even if the officer had been in hot pursuit of the defendants for the commission of the
burglary, it had "grave doubt[s]" that this death would be "'a natural
and probable consequence of the commission' of the burglary."' 7 1 The
court quoted the legal relationship test from Hoffman72 while declaring
that the officer's death did not "occur by reason of or as part of such
burglary." 73 By adopting the Hoffman analysis the court implicitly
stated that even if the express language of the felony-murder statute had
changed since the days of Hoffman, the court intended to apply a similar
test to determine the causal relationship between the felony and the
death. It is also possible that Brook reflects the court's reluctance to
allow defendants a wide latitude in using felony murder as a lesser-included offense in homicide prosecutions. Whatever the policy reason for
its holding, the court clearly placed the felony-murder statute within a
historical context to reach its conclusion. 74
The 1958 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of State v. Carlson75
placed new restrictions on the operation of the felony-murder statute.
Police arrested the defendant after an early morning fire in a Milwaukee
apartment building claimed the life of a woman who was sleeping inside.76 The defendant was charged and convicted of both arson 77 and
79
felony murder 78 for causing a death as a "consequence of the arson.
The trial court sentenced the defendant to prison for fifteen years for
arson and not more than thirty years for the felony murder, with the
sentences running concurrently.80
70. Id. at 41, 123 N.W.2d at 539. "[T]here is no evidence that the burglary had even been
detected at the time Officer Eiler stopped defendant's car. Therefore, there was no connection between the burglary and such stopping." Id.
71. Id.

72. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
73. Brook, 21 Wis. 2d at 41, 123 N.W.2d at 540.
74. The importance that the Wisconsin courts place on the historical development of the
felony-murder doctrine is not unique to this jurisdiction. Many state-courts, when grappling
with the interpretive problems of the doctrine, reach back to common-law reasoning to justify
the continuing existence of the rule. See Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 162-63 (Del. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400, 409 (Mass. 1982).
75. 5 Wis. 2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958).
76. Id. at 597, 93 N.W.2d at 355.

77. Wis. STAT. § 943.02(1)(a) (1957).
78. Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (1957).
2d at 596-97, 93 N.W.2d at 355.
79. Carlson, 5 W'Mis.
80. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:785

The supreme court held that the defendant could not be convicted of
both arson and felony murder."' The court stated that the 1956 revision
to the statute changed the operation of the felony-murder doctrine. s2
The court stated, "[p]utting it in different words ....[felony murder] is a

combination of a felony or attempted felony, and the fact that in the
commission or attempt, a death was caused." 3 Thus, the court concluded that the felony-murder charge actually added an additional element to the arson-the causing of a death 84-affecting the maximum
sentence.85 The charging and conviction of both the underlying felony
and felony-murder violated the defendant's constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.8 6 The jury could still receive ins'tructions for
felony murder and arson, but the arson instruction
would be considered
s7
a lesser-included offense to the felony murder.
While Brook and Carlson dealt with the felony-murder statute before
it had been encapsulated in second-degree murder; State v. Norenss specifically addressed the "natural and probable consequence" language of
the post-1977 revised statute. In Noren, the court of appeals faced a new
factual situation. The defendant, while committing a robbery, struck the
victim three times with his closed fist.8 9 The victim was extremely drunk

at the time and suffered from a pre-existing respiratory condition. 90 The
defendant's assault caused the victim to lose consciousness and he later
81. Id. at 607-08, 93 N.W.2d at 361. Because the sentences were concurrent, the court
stated that the defendant really suffered no injury, but it nonetheless reversed the judgment in
order to clarify the record. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 608, 93 N.W.2d at 361.
84. Id. The court stated:
The information charging [the] defendant with third-degree murder in effect charged
the arson and alleged the causing of the death as an additional element affecting the
maximum sentence; the verdict of guilty of third-degree murder in effect found the
defendant guilty of arson and of the additional element of causing the death; upon such
conviction the defendant was properly sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
thirty years (fifteen, the maximum for the arson..., plus fifteen, the additional number
of years provided by [the felony-murder statute]).
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. "There was no occasion for a separate information charging arson and if the two
proceedings had been tried separately, jeopardy in the first would have been a defense in the
second." Id.
87. Id. at 608-09, 93 N.W.2d at 361.
88. 125 Wis. 2d 204, 371 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1985).
89. Id. at 206, 371 N.W.2d at 383.
90. Id. The victim's blood alcohol content was .38% at the time of his death; in addition
the victim suffered from a condition that impeded his body from removing mucus from his
lungs. Id.
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died.91 Noren was convicted of second-degree murder; he appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the victim's death was a natural and probable consequence of
the felonious robbery. 2
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim and for the first
time defined "natural and probable" under the felony-murder statute.93
The court applied a proximate cause test to determine whether a death
was the natural consequence of a felony. 94 Specifically, the court required that, in order to be a natural consequence of the robbery, "the
defendant's conduct ... [must be] a substantial factor in causing the
death.,,g
In addition the court defined "probable" by declaring that the term
referred to the "foreseeability of death. ' 96 The court then assigned the
level of foreseeability necessary for-criminal liability to attach under the
felony-murder statute. 97 First, the court listed the various levels of foreseeability necessary for liability under a variety of civil and criminal situations. 98 Next, the court reiterated the policy reasons for the inclusion of
the "natural and probable consequence" language in the statute. 99 Stat91. Id.
92. Id. at 205, 371 N.W.2d at 383.
93. Id. at 208, 371 N.W.2d at 384.
94. Id at 207-08, 371 N.W.2d at 383-84.
95. Id. at 207,371 N.W.2d at 383 (citing State v. Serebin, 119 Wis. 2d 837,846,350 N.W.2d
65, 70 (1984)). The court in Serebin applied a test derived from Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371,
397, 249 N.W.2d 810, 822 (1977). "As to causation, this court has adopted the 'substantial
factor' formulation of the test. If a party's negligence is a substantial factor in producing a
victim's injury, he is liable therefore, and there may be more than one substantial causative
factor in any given case." Hart,75 Wis. 2d at 397, 249 N.W.2d at 822 (citations omitted).
96. Noren, 125 Wis. 2d at 207, 371 N.W.2d at 383.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court stated:
To constitute negligence, harm must be probable rather than merely possible. Negligent homicide requires that conduct create a high probability of death or great bodily
harm. "High probability" is defined as a probability that the ordinary person, having in
mind all the circumstances, including the seriousness of the consequences, would consider unreasonable. It does not mean that the mathematical probability of the consequences must be greater than fifty percent. Death caused by conduct evincing a
depraved mind, sec. 940.02(1), Stats., requires that the defendant's conduct be imminently dangerous to human life. "Imminently dangerous" means that the conduct is
dangerous in and of itself; it must have been inherently, apparently, and consciously
dangerous to life and not such as might casually produce death by misadventure.
Id. at 207, 371 N.W.2d at 383-84 (citations omitted). By listing the varied ranges of causation
necessary for culpability to attach under distinct areas of Wisconsin law, the court of appeals
provided a platform upon which it could support it decision with respect to the new felonymurder statute.
99. Id. at 208, 371 N.W.2d at 384.
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ing that the phrase was "intended to limit felony-murder liability to situations where the defendant's conduct creates some measure of
foreseeable risk of death,"'100 the court attached a requirement that the
level of foreseeability needed for felony murder should be the same as
that required for depraved mind murder; that is, the acts causing death
must be inherently dangerous to life. 101 The court supported its adoption of the "inherently dangerous standard" by stating that most other
jurisdictions followed this test as well.'0 2
Finally, the court concluded its analysis of the felony-murder statute
by tracing the inherently dangerous test, to Judge Stephen's decision in
Regina v. Serng.'03 In adopting the inherently dangerous test, the court
stated that it was persuaded that Wisconsin's felony-murder statute
originated from Sern and therefore the state should also adopt the rea04
soning of the case.

The last case focusing on the felony-murder doctrine in Wisconsin is
the most important because it gave ammunition to critics of the doctrine
during the 1988 revision of the homicide statutes. In 1983, concurrent
with early meetings of the Special Committee, the Wisconsin Supreme

100. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 cmt. 4C at 37 (Tentative Draft No. 9 1959)).
See supra note 35 and accompanying text. It is interesting that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals looked to the Model Penal Code for justification of its new foreseeability test, since the
Code's recommendations on felony-murder are one of its least implemented provisions. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
101. Noren, 125 Wis. 2d at 208, 371 N.W.2d at 384. "We apply this test to felony-murder
because it requires a high degree of foreseeability, thereby implicitly requiring greater culpability than lesser grades of homicide." Id.
102. Id; see, e.g., State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153, 160 (Kan. 1980); State v. Harrison,
564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1977).
103. 16 Cox Crim. Cases 311 (Central Crim. Ct. 1887); see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
104. Noren, 125 Wis. 2d at 209, 371 N.W.2d at 384. The court provides no basis for this
claim other than most other courts that adopted the inherently dangerous test relied on Sern
for their justification. The influence of Judge Stephen's reasoning in Sernd is remarkable. The
English case was decided in 1887, decades after the first codification of the felony-murder rule
in Wisconsin. See supranotes 38-43 and accompanying text. Additionally, eight years prior to
Sernd, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had already required that an act constituting a felony
under the early felony-murder statutes must in itself be dangerous to life. Pliemling v. State,
46 Wis. 516, 521, 1 N.W. 278, 281 (1879); see supra notes 44-47. Thus, the court's claim that
Wisconsin's felony-murder statute originated from Sern is dubious at best. A more accurate
statement may be that Wisconsin's felony-murder doctrine developed during a period of hostility to the harsh operation of the doctrine at common law similar to that under which Sern
originated. Therefore, any future reliance by Wisconsin courts on this claim must be
questioned.
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Court in State v. Gordon'0 5 severely limited the usefulness of felony murder as a second-degree murder offense.
In Gordon the defendant had been convicted of kidnapping, robbery,
burglary, and second-degree murder (felony murder). 10 6 The trial court
found that kidnapping was the underlying offense for the felony-murder
conviction and sentenced Gordon to fifteen years for the kidnapping and
fifteen years for the felony murder. 0 7 Gordon appealed arguing that
her separate convictions and sentencing for the felony murder and the
lesser-included offense of kidnapping violated her constitutional rights
against double jeopardy.10 8 The supreme court, similar to its ruling in
Carlson, agreed, vacated the kidnapping conviction, and remanded for
resentencing.10 9
The court held that when the state legislature revised the felony-murder statute in 1977 and included it under second-degree murder, the legislature "did not expressly authorize punishment for both the underlying
felony and felony murder." 10 Since the legislature did not show a clear
intent to allow cumulative sentencing for the felony murder and the underlying felony, Gordon's sentence for kidnapping violated double
jeopardy."'
The upshot of Gordon was that defendants who were committing a
Class B felony" 2 at the time they caused the death of someone could
only be convicted of and be sentenced for either the underlying felony or
the second-degree murder (felony murder). Since the cumulative effects
of felony-murder sentencing were no longer possible, the benefit to the
state during plea negotiations was also gone." 3 The court gutted one of
the lingering uses for the felony-murder statute on the basis that there
was no clear way to establish the legislature's intent because there were
105. 111 Wis. 2d 133, 330 N.W.2d 564 (1983).
106. Id. at 134, 330 N.W.2d at 564.
107. Id. at 134-35, 330 N.W.2d at 564.

108. Id. at 135, 330 N.W.2d at 564.
109. Id. at 136, 330 N.W.2d at 565.
110. Id.The court based its decision on the United States Supreme Court ruling in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983), which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause (in cases of

cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial) prevents the court from sentencing a defendant
for a greater term than the legislature intended. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 137, 330 N.W.2d at
565.
111. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 137-40, 330 N.W.2d at 565-67.
112. In the case of a Class C or D felony, cumulative sentencing could still be allowed
under Gordon. Id. at 142, 330 N.W.2d at 568.
113. See supra note 55.
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no records of why felony murder
had been attached to second-degree
114
murder in the 1977 revision.
These four cases provide the background that the Wisconsin Judicial
Council's Special Committee on Homicide and Lesser-Included Offenses
was confronting when it began its revision of the criminal code in 1982.
The past legislative and judicial development of the felony-murder doctrine provided a starting point for the Special Committee and led to the
eventual adoption of the current felony-murder statute in 1988.
C.

A History of the 1988 Revision of Section 940.03

When the Wisconsin Judicial Council appointed its Special Committee in 1982, the members of the committee agreed early on that the main
task before them was to clarify the homicide statutes that were left in a
confused state after the 1956 revisions."15 Thus, for the next two years
the Special Committee met regularly and arduously went about this difficult task. While they simply meant to clarify the statutes and not make
changes to the substantive criminal law in Wisconsin, it became readily
apparent that this committee, like
those before it, would attempt to re6
statute."
felony-murder
the
peal
At the outset several members of the committee stated their belief
that the felony-murder statute was no longer necessary." 7 They argued
that any murder committed in the course of a felony could be charged
under one of the other proposed felony statutes."" It also was apparent
114. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
115. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 1-15 (Sept. 10, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIE REvIsION, supra
note 6); see also Dickey et al., supra note 6. at 1328.
116. See supra note 9; see, e.g., Draft 0: Tentative Revision of Homicide Statutes 1 (Nov.
5, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOIcroE RIWsION, supra note 6).
117. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 24 (Nov. 11, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HoMIcIDE REviSION, supra note
6); see Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1367.
118. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 25 (Nov. 11, 1982) (unpublished, on fie in HOICIDE REVIsIo N, supra note
6). The summary states:
The committee continued to try to imagine crimes which might not be first or second degree murder but which would be covered by felony murder. Mr. Malmstadt
gave the example of a person who pours gasoline on the floor of the apartment above
that of his intended victims and then lights a match to it. The committee members
agreed that this would constitute first degree murder. Mr. Becker gave the example of
an armed robber who is backing out the door with his gun trained on the customers in
the store when another customer coming through the door bumps his arm causing the
gun to discharge. Prof. Dickey thought this could be second degree murder because
pointing a loaded gun at people in that situation evinces a depraved mind. Mr. Becker
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to the Special Committee, however, that it would be politically unpopular to repeal the statute, and therefore it might be expedient to come up
with an alternative statute to the currently existing one.11 9
Accordingly, throughout the remaining meetings the Special Committee would contend with the felony-murder issue on two levels. First,
the members agreed to recommend to the Judicial Council that the legislature repeal the last vestiges of felony murder in Wisconsin 120 , but second, if this was politically impossible, the Special Committee would
devise a new felony-murder statute more consistent with the overall approach of the revised homicide statutes. 121
One of the first ideas the Special Committee discussed was whether
to include felony murder as a subsection of first-degree murder, but to
limit it to killings occurring in the course of a specific and limited
number of felonies.'1' While the idea to include felony murder as a class
of first-degree homicide was later dropped out of political necessity, the
limitation of the statute's applicability to specific underlying felonies became an integral part of the eventual statute.
Accordingly, the early discussions quickly laid down a predicate that
the new statute would activate only if a death was caused in the commission or attempted commission of a set number of felonies.123 The initial
list was to include all Class B felonies."2 4 In addition, felony murder
didn't think it could be second degree murder because the pulling of the trigger was not
an intentional act. Nevertheless, responded Prof. Dickey, the person intended to point
a loaded gun at innocent persons and that intentional act suffices.
Id. at 25-26.
119. Id. at 26. Three members of the Special Committee, Professor Remington, Judge
Barron, and Senator Hanaway, specifically mentioned the difficulty they perceived in getting
the Wisconsin Legislature to abolish felony murder. Id.
120. Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial Council 3 (Dec. 17,1982) (unpublished, on file

in HOMICIDE

REvISION,

supra note 6).

121. See Memorandum from Jim Fullin, Executive Secretary and Reporter, Wisconsin Judicial Council, to Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 11-12 (Nov. 5, 1982)
(unpublished, on file in HoucInE RE-vISION, supra note 6). CompareDraft 0, supra note 113
("This draft repeals Wisconsin's "felony murder" statute.") with Draft R: Tentative Revision
of Homicide Statutes 5 (Dec. 10, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMIcDE REVISION, supra
note 6) ("Whoever causes the death of another human being while violating or attempting to
violate [enumerated felonies] is guilty of a class A Felony.").
122. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 26 (Nov. 11, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIDE REvISION, supra note
6). The Special Committee noted that the Model Penal Code referred to robbery, rape or
deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape
as serious felonies. Id.
123. Summary of Proceedings Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 9-12
(Jan. 21, 1983) (unpublished, on file in HoMICIE REVISION, supra note 6).
124. Id. at 12.
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would now be classified as a Class A felony,"2 thereby increasing the
maximum penalty for felony murder from ten years to life imprisonment.' 26 To minimize changes to the present statute, there was some
discussion over whether to include the requirement that the death be a
natural and probable consequence of the crime, but the Special Committee decided that this approach was really an alternative to a specific felonies limitation and it quickly dropped the idea.'2 7 One member of the
Special Committee offered that if the statute was going to enumerate
specific felonies to limit the harsh effects of the felony-murder rule, there
should be no corresponding limitation placed on how the death was
caused.

28

This approach seems to have been accepted by the Special Committee as a whole:
Prof. Remington stated that the intent of the committee is to include any homicide caused in the commission or an attempt to
commit any of [the] enumerated offenses. There may be disputation about when a felony begins and ends, but there need not be
any litigation over whether the homicide was foreseeable when
the criminal enterprise was undertaken.... If we're going to have
to litigate foreseeability or causal connection, we might as well
125. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 26 (Nov. 11, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIDE REVISION, supra note

6).
126. Minutes of Meeting of the Judicial Council 3 (Dec. 17, 1982) (unpublished, on file in
HOMICIDE REVISION, supra note 6).
127. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 11-12 (Nov. 5, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIDE REVISION, supra
note 6).
128. University of Wisconsin Law Professor Frank Remington, who was a member of the
original 1956 revision committee, believed that the 'natural and probable consequences' rule
was developed as an alternative to the specified felonies approach:
Jurisdictions which restrict the underlying felony to a few heinous offenses do not need
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, too.... Even when the victim dies of
a heart attack from fright rather than from wounds inflicted by the weapon, the courts
have sustained felony murder convictions. And there is no reason why they shouldn't.
After all, the purpose of felony murder is to deter armed burglary and armed robbery.
Why litigate the foreseeability of the death? Whether the [clerk] dies because you
shoot him or because he has a heart attack when you draw your gun, you've had it.
There is fair warning in the statute that if you cause death while embarked on these
crimes you'll get life imprisonment whether or not you intend to kill. If that seems too
hard and inflexible, Wisconsin could go back to the penalty enhancement approach,
giving the judge some discretion about the length of the penalty. But the states that
have gone the hard-line route have had the least trouble in terms of litigation and
appeals on foreseeability.
Summary of Proceedings Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 12-13 (Mar. 18,
1983) (unpublished, on file in HoMIciDE REVISION, supra note 6).
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not have the statute at all. He hoped it was clear that if the defendant causes the death while committing or attempting to commit a Class B felony, no further inquiry into culpability is
required. Even if the defendant is completely without negligence
in running over someone while making off with the proceeds of
an armed robbery, he would be liable. The committee agreed that
this was its intent. However, it was unlikely to be reflected in the
statutory note because the bill will call for the abolition of felony
murder; and only if this is unacceptable to the legislature will felony murder be restored through amendment (amendments do not
usually carry Judicial Council Notes). 12 9
It is therefore apparent that if the felony-murder statute could not be
repealed, the alternative statute would limit the troublesome aspects of
the doctrine by only affixing liability under a specific set of underlying
felonies. The exact causal nature between the death and the defendant
was not intended to be limited beyond the usual "substantial factor"
test.130
In June 1983, the proposed homicide bill was completed and sent to
the Judicial Council for approval with the express intention to repeal
felony murder set forth; however, the "alternative" felony-murder statute was "kept somewhat under wraps until such time as the proposed
repeal might meet significant political resistance."' 131 Members of the
Special Committee presented the bill to various members of the criminal
bar 132 and it was one of these constituencies-the Wisconsin District Attorneys Association (WDAA)-that would first raise resistance to the
proposed repeal of felony murder. 33 At their 1985 Winter Conference,
129. Summary of Proceedings Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 8-9
(Apr. 22, 1983) (emphasis added) (unpublished, on file inHOMICIDE REvIsoN, supra note 6).
This opinion may not have been unanimous, however. At least one member of the Special
Committee was leery about expanding the potential causal liability under the felony-murder

statute:
Regarding felony murder, [Mr. Croak] said, some states have a rule that if the police
kill one of two escaping bank robbers, the other one can be charged with felony murder
in his death. [Mr. Croak] certainly wouldn't advocate such a rule for Wisconsin.
Summary of Proceedings Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 6 (Sept. 10,
1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIDE REVIsION, supra note 6).
130. Summary of Proceedings Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 9
(Apr. 22, 1983) (unpublished, on file in HOMICIDE REviSION, supra note 6).
131. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1369.
132. Presentation by David J. Becker to Wisconsin District Attorneys Association Summer Conference 1 (June 30, 1983) (unpublished, on file in HOMIDE REVISION, supra note 6).
133. Letter (including resolution) from John E. Fryatt, President, Wisconsin District Attorneys Association, to James Fullin, Wisconsin Judicial Council 1-3 (Feb. 5, 1985) (unpublished, on file in HoMIciDE REVIsIoN, supra note 6).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:785

the WDAA proposed that felony murder be retained, however, it would
accept the "alternative" version of the statute that the Special Committee had kept under wraps with the addition of several more underlying
felonies."M Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson La Follette concurred
with the WDAA and supported its proposed amendments. 35
Professor Remington feared that the WDAA proposal could lead to
a "Christmas Tree" effect with additional underlying felonies added to
the statute until it was unworkable.1 36 He again stated his preference "to
limit the statute to the clearly dangerous situations and, as to those,
make clear that there is liability if death is caused (no matter how it
occurs).'

37

The Judicial Council accepted the WDAA amendments for the most
part, 38 and the bill was presented to the Wisconsin Senate. 3 9 The "1985
Senate Bill 279 included felony murder in substantially the form approved by the Judicial Council committee as its "fall-back" position."' 40
Thus, the bill revised felony murder "by limiting it to homicides caused
in the commission or attempt to commit arson, armed burglary, armed
robbery, first-degree sexual assault or second-degree sexual assault by
use or threat of force or violence."'' The penalty was increased from a
Class B to a Class A felony. 42 The Senate's Committee on Judiciary and
Consumer Affairs, however, recommended an amendment that would
repeal the felony-murder statute rather than changing it to the alternative version. 143 The amendment was passed by the Senate and the bill
134. Id. at 1-2; see Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1369.
135. Letter from Bronson La Follette, Wisconsin Attorney General, to Judicial Council 12 (Feb. 7, 1985) (on file in HOMICIDE REVISION, supra note 6).
136. Letter from Frank Remington, University of Wisconsin Law School Professor of
Law, to David Becker, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General, 1 (Feb. 12, 1985) (on file in
HOMICIDE REVISION, supra note 6).
137. Id. at 2.
138. Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial Council 4-9 (Apr. 19, 1985) (unpublished, on
file in HOMICmE REVISION, supra note 6).
139. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1369.
140. Id.
141. Summary of Judicial Council Homicide Bill (LRB-1519/2) (unpublished, on file in
HOMICIDE REViSION, supra note 6).
142. Ld
143. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1369. As noted by Dickey, this action drew considerable criticism from a Milwaukee Journal editorial:
Wisconsin needs a stronger felony murder statute to adequately punish those who
kill while committing, or attempting to commit, certain crimes. Such slayings ought to
be treated as first-degree murder, and the offenders should be punished with life
imprisonment.
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was sent to the Assembly, but it never
reached a floor vote and thus died
1
at the end of the legislative session. 44
When passage of the bill was attempted again during the 1987 floor
session it was apparent that a major roadblock in passing the homicide
revisions was the reluctancy on the part of many senators to the harsh
penalty prescribed by the felony-murder statute. 145 Therefore, the Judicial Council proposed that instead of making felony murder a Class A
felony it should attach "a penalty of up to twenty years in excess of the
maximum prescribed for the underlying felony."'" The deadlock over
felony murder dissipated. The entire homicide revision was attached to
a budget review bill and passed at the end of the 1987-88 legislative session.1 47 Its effective date was January 1, 1989.148
The above discussion presents a cogent example of how historically
difficult any attempt to repeal the felony-murder doctrine in Wisconsin
has been. While the Special Committee originally wanted to abolish felony murder, the end result of the committee's hard work was instead an
entirely new felony-murder statute. This new statute severed the historical continuity under which the felony-murder doctrine had developed in
Wisconsin. In the past, the main restriction on the operation of the felony-murder doctrine had been the necessity that the death be a natural
and probable consequence of the felony. This restriction was dropped
under the new statute and replaced with the specific enumerated felonies
proviso. The Special Committee's attempt to clarify the homicide statutes in Wisconsin actually unearthed a new problem, one that will be
discussed in Part HI.
III.

ATrACHING VicARIous LIABILITY TO ACCOMPLICES UNDER THE

FELONY-MURDER DoCTRumN

As can be seen by the discussion in Part II, the felony-murder doctrine has proved to be one of the more contentious remnants of the common law.
So that society may properly express its revulsion at killing in the commission of
crime, and so that offenders may be properly punished, Wisconsin lawmakers should
enact an appropriately strong felony murder statute.
Law Should Quit Coddling Killers, MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 12, 1986, (Accent § ) at 6.
144. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1369-70.
145. Id. at 1370.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Act of May 13, 1988, 1987 Wis. Act 399, § 3203(57)(ag), 1541, 1874.
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Criticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine: it has been
described as "astonishing" and "monstrous" an unsupportable
"legal fiction," "an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal
law," and as an "anachronistic remnant" that "'has no logical or
practical basis for existence in modem law.' "149

While the doctrine as a whole has been criticized, a corollary of the rule
has proved even more troublesome. This problem appears when someone other than the defendant causes a death during the commission of a
felony. Under common law, defendants could be found guilty of felony
murder no matter if they, the accomplice, or the victim caused a death
during the defendant's commission or attempted commission of the underlying felony. 5 ' As will be discussed below, some states have attempted to limit the applicability of the doctrine in a number of ways,
particularly with respect to deaths caused by someone other than the
accused.
Wisconsin had little difficulty with this troublesome corollary because
the past felony-murder statutes and the interpretations handed down by
the Wisconsin courts had sufficiently narrowed the focus of the doctrine
to exclude the necessity of attaching vicarious liability to actors other
than the defendant. Therefore, no appellate or supreme court cases in
the past discussed the above situation. The 1988 revision of the felonymurder statute changed this.
In their attempt to clarify or repeal the felony-murder statute in Wisconsin, the members of the Special Committee left open a serious breach
in the application of the felony-murder rule. As three of the members of
the Special Committee stated:
The problem with the connection between the felony and the
death has surfaced in two typical situations which may still arise
under Wisconsin's revision. One involves the death of an accomplice or co-conspirator. If Smith and Jones commit an armed robbery and Jones is killed by the robbery victim, is Smith guilty of
felony murder for the death of her accomplice? ... Under the

prior Wisconsin statute, felony murder liability was limited to
foreseeable results, which were in turn limited to deaths caused
by an act in and of itself dangerous to life. Whether the same
standard will be applied under the revised statute is an open
question.' 5 '
149. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 446 (citations omitted).
150. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 413.
151. Dickey et al., supra note 6, at 1371-72 (footnotes omitted).
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The problem arises because of the vague language of the statute. Specifically, the statute provides:
940.03 Felony Murder
Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in s. 940.225 (1) or
(2)(a), 943.02, 943.10 (2) or 943.32 (2) may be imprisoned for not
more than 20 years in excess of the maximum period
of imprison52
ment provided by law for that crime or attempt.
A strict construction of the language of the statute seemingly opens up
prosecution for felony murder to anyone who causes the death of someone during the attempt or commission of five specific felonies. Thus, if a
defendant and an accomplice commit an armed robbery and in the process the victim or a police officer kills the accomplice, the defendant is
criminally liable for the death of the accomplice.
This breach provided a new opportunity for prosecutors to extend
criminal liability to accomplices in felonies in which someone other than
the principal defendant caused a death. It is no surprise then that prosecutors were quick to test the limits of this extended liability. 53 The next
section will detail the two prevailing methods courts have used in addressing this troublesome corollary.
A.

The Agency Theory and the Proximate Causation Test

Many jurisdictions have confronted the issue of causation between
the defendant and a death committed by someone resisting the defendant's felonious act in one of two ways: the "agency theory" or the "proximate cause theory." 54 While both limit the potential acts for which the
defendant is liable, each arrives at this result in vastly different ways.
The agency theory in its most basic form operates in the following
manner: "for a defendant to be held guilty of murder, it is necessary that
152. Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (1991-92) (emphasis added).
153. See discussion of Oimen, Rivera, and State v. Chambers,183 Wis. 2d 316,515 N.W.2d
531 (Ct. App. 1994), infra part mH.C.
154. The most comprehensive discussion of criminal liability in these situations, particularly on a national scale, is Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Criminal Liability Where Act of
Killing Is Done by One Resisting Felony or Other Unlawful Act Committed by Defendant,56
A.L.R3d 239 (1974); see also DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 471-72; 2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra
note 16, at 211-21; David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder
Doctrine, 8 HAxv. J.L. & Pui. PoL'Y 359, 383-87 (1985). Just prior to publication of this
Comment, Professor Michelle S. Simon published another thorough article discussing felony
murder and accomplice liability. See generallyMichelle S. Simon, Whose Crime is it Anyway?
Liabilityfor the Lethal Acts of Nonparticipantsin the Felony, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 223
(1994).
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the act of killing be that of the defendant, and for the act to be his, it is
necessary that it be committed by him or by someone acting in concert
with him."'155 It is obvious from this definition that a jurisdiction that
follows the agency theory would preclude criminal liability of the defendant for a death caused by someone resisting the felony.
The agency theory as stated above, or variations of it, has become the
most widely accepted methodology of limiting liability in felony-murder
statutes.56 States are increasingly turning to the agency theory either by
statutory construction or judicial rulings and have thereby removed the
open-ended strict liability of the felony-murder rule that occurred at
common law. This is increasingly apparent as states revise their respective homicide statutes. 57
While the agency theory has gained prominence in recent years,
many states still limit felony-murder liability by using a theory of proximate causation. 8 There are many derivations of this theory in place, 59
but briefly stated the theory "holds that if the homicide is the product of
an unexpected chain of events, unrelated to some life-endangering aspect of the underlying felonious conduct, there is no liability. Deaths
that are reasonably foreseeable results of the underlying conduct, on the
other hand, qualify as felony murders."'' 1 Thus, there could be situations in which the defendant's actions were so dangerous in the course of
committing a felony that a death would likely be the result. This could
also include the situation in which a death was caused by the intended
victim of the crime, where liability would attach to the defendant for the
victim's actions.
In order to analyze Wisconsin's felony-murder statute in the context
of these two limiting theories it is necessary to see how other states have
addressed this troublesome issue. A comparison of the approaches of all
jurisdictions in the United States is beyond the scope of this Comment,
however, and the next section will therefore survey nine states that have
similar statutory language to Wisconsin's felony-murder statute.

155. Barbre, supra note 154, at 242.
156. State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Minn. 1992).
157. See id. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Branson was analyzing Minnesota's felonymurder statute, MnqN. STAT. § 609.19(2) (1990), for the first time since its statute was revised
in 1981. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
158. Barbre, supra note 154, at 252-61; Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 383-91.
159. See Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 383-84.
160. Id.
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B. Survey of Felony-Murder Statutes in Other States
A brief survey of the various state statutes delineating the felonymurder rule shows that very few include specific statutory language similar to the 'Wisconsinfelony-murder statute. Of the nine states 16 1 that do
use the general phrase "cause the death" within their statutes, only Minnesota and Georgia use language that is nearly identical in form to Wisconsin's statute. Of these two, Minnesota Statute Section 609.19 is more
similar in its construction and language to that of Wisconsin Statute Section 940.03.162 All of the remaining states have clarified, in their statutory language, the intention of the legislature in applying liability to the
defendant for a death caused by another person.
Neither Minnesota nor Georgia has adopted the agency theory as a
rule of law in the application of the felony-murder doctrine; however,
both states have construed their statute to garner the same result as the
agency theory. In State v. Branson,63 the Minnesota Supreme Court recently faced a factual situation in which a defendant was convicted of
felony murder after a bystander was killed in exchange of gunfire between members of two rival gangs.164 The defendant was an alleged participant in the shooting exchange but did not fire the fatal shot.165
The supreme court reversed the jury's conviction, holding that the
Minnesota felony-murder statute, which had been revised in 1981, did
not evince a new legislative intent to expand liability to persons other
than those who directly committed the killing.'6 Before the 1981 revision, the Minnesota law required that the "person killed be the object of
the predicate felony."' 67
However, the court did not formally adopt the agency theory in
Branson,.stating"[i]t has long been the law that only a person.., who
caused the death of another person while committing or attempting to
161. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, and
New Jersey.

162.

MIn.

STAT.

§ 609.19 (1990). The statute reads:

Whoever does.., the following is guilty of murder in the second degree and may be
sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years: ... (2) Causes the death of a
human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or
attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or
second degree with force or violence.
Id.
163. State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 1992).

164. Id at 880-81.
165. Id. at 881.

166. Id at 885.
167. Id. at 884.
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commit a felony could be charged with felony murder. The amendatory
provisions of 1981 did not change the law in this regard.' 168 Therefore,
basing its decision outside the agency theory-proximate cause debate
and relying on the felony-murder doctrine's history in Minnesota-the
court nonetheless found that a defendant could not be guilty of a death
caused by a person other than the defendant or accomplice to the felony.
In practical terms, the court's result is the same as that which an implementation of the agency theory would have provided.
Georgia has dealt with the felony-murder issue in a different way.
The Georgia statute provides that "[a] person also commits the offense
he causes the death of
of murder when, in the commission of a felony,
1 69
malice."'
of
irrespective
being
human
another
The Georgia Supreme Court also refused to hold a person liable for a
death caused by a person who was not the defendant or an accomplice to
the felony. In State v. Crane,'70 a would-be burglar was shot and killed
by the intended victim of the crime, and the deceased burglar's accomplices were charged with felony murder.17 ' The court actually favored
an interpretation of Georgia's felony-murder statute to include deaths
"indirectly caused by one of the parties, as in the present case where the
parties caused the intended victim of the burglary to shoot and kill one
of their number.' 72 However, citing Georgia rules of statutory interpretation (which demanded in cases of dual construction of statutory language that the statute must be construed against the state), 73 the court
stated it was the responsibility of the Georgia Legislature to choose
whether it wanted the felony-murder doctrine to extend to the fact situation presented before it.1 7 4 Therefore, the Georgia Supreme Court, similar to its counterpart in Minnesota, adopted the agency theory result
without expressly adopting the agency theory as a rule of law.
All of the remaining states surveyed have constructed their statutes
with less ambiguous language than Minnesota, Georgia, or Wisconsin.
In so doing, they have eliminated the confusion garnered in the states
previously discussed.
168. Id. at 885.

169.

GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (Michie 1990).
170. 279 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 1981).
171. Id. at 696; accord Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518,521 (Ga. 1982) (where a bystander was
killed by a police officer in pursuit of defendant).
172. Crane, 279 S.E.2d at 696.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 697.
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Alaska and New Jersey use similar language in their felony-murder
statutes. They both state that a defendant is guilty of murder if, while
the defendant is engaging in or attempting to commit an enumerated
felony, "any person causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants." 175
In State v. Martin,176 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in modifying
the proximate cause theory held that "a defendant should be exculpated
only when a death occurs in a manner that is so unexpected or unusual
that he or she could not justly be found culpable for the result."1 77 Thus,
"in a robbery of a store in which 'the shopkeeper fires at the robber but
instead kills an innocent bystander,' the death would not [be] too remote
for the defendant to be guilty of felony murder."' 78 As stated in Martin,'7 9 the court's adoption of this proximate cause test came only after
the New Jersey Legislature changed its statute on felony murder in response to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Canola.80
In Canola the court had adopted the agency theory, thus limiting the
felony-murder rule to deaths caused by the defendant or an accomplice.' 81 Accordingly, in order for the New Jersey Supreme Court to
adopt the proximate cause rule, the legislature had to specifically alter
the statute to its present language. Prior to this point no liability would
be attached under the agency theory.
The remaining states all have specific language that on their face
ascribe to either the agency theory or proximate cause theory. In Connecticut a defendant is guilty of felony murder if, while committing or
attempting to commit a specified felony, "and, in the course of and in
furtherance of such crime or flight therefrom, he, or another participant,
if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants." 8 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the limiting language of "in furtherance of" imposes a proximate cause requirement
"beyond that of mere causation in fact."' 3 In addition, the court stated,
"[i]t is not enough, however, that the defendant committed a robbery
175. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(3) (West
1990).
176. State v. Martin, 573 A2d 1359 (N.J. 1990).
177. Id. at 1375.
178. Martin, 573 A.2d at 1375 (quoting NEW JERSEY SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE COMMrrrEE SUBSTnTuTE, No. 1537, § 14 (1981)).
179. Id. at 1371.
180. 374 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1977).
181. Id. at 25.
182. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54c (1991).
183. State v. Young, 469 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Conn. 1983).
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and caused the death of the victim unless the death was a part of the
robbery and directly involved in it."'1 4 Furthermore, liability would not
extend outside those murders committed by the defendant or
accomplices.' 5
Similarly, the legislature in Maine enacted legislation which states
that one is liable if "the person or another participant in fact causes the
death of a human being, and the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence."' 6 Thus, in both Connecticut and Maine the statute itself delineates that only defendants and their accomplices can cause the death in
question if felony-murder liability is to affix.
For comparison, Arkansas and Colorado prescribe use of the proximate cause theory. Arkansas's statute reads "[a] person commits manslaughter if ....Another person who is resisting such offense or flight

Colorado provides criminal liability
causes the death of any person.'
if "the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by
anyone."' 8 Once again the statutes specify which theory is in effect.
Finally, Arizona's statute states a person is liable under the felonymurder doctrine if "such person [the defendant] or another person
causes the death of any person.'

89

The Arizona Supreme Court has

held that for liability to be established "the death [must] result from an
action taken to facilitate the accomplishment of one or more of the felonies enumerated in [the felony-murder statute].' 19 0 The court has additionally concluded that the statute requires that "but/for causation" is a
necessary element before a jury can convict.' 9 '
A comparison of the various felony-murder statutes above reveals
that when ambiguity in the statute's required casual relationship occurs,
most states have held the defendant is not liable for a death caused by
someone other than the defendant or his or her accomplices. Only in
states in which the statutory language is more specific as to its intent
does one find a willingness on the part of the various courts to adopt a
stricter form of felony-murder liability.
While the states above have reached divergent views on how to best
implement the felony-murder rule it is important to note that the histori184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

State v. Cobbs, 522 A.2d 1229, 1230 (Conn. 1987).
Young, 469 A.2d at 1193.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 202(1) (West 1992).
ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-10-104(a)(4)(B) (Michie 1992).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (1990).
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(2) (1992).
State v. Arias, 641 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Ariz. 1982).
State v. Wiley, 698 P.2d 1244, 1258-59 (Ariz. 1985).
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cal development of felony murder in each state carried great weight in
each court's eventual dispensation. Accordingly, the next section discusses the three recent Wisconsin cases interpreting Section 940.03 and
highlights the manner in which Wisconsin has broken from the historical
development of the felony-murder doctrine in the state. In all three
cases, the Wisconsin courts rejected the national trend to limit the
sweeping breadth of the felony-murder doctrine in situations when
someone other than the defendant caused a death in the commissionl of a
crime. In doing so,' the courts provided prosecutors with a extremely
wide net under which they could charge individuals with felony murder.
C. State v. Chambers, State v. Oimen, and State v. Rivera
The first case released by a Wisconsin court interpreting the breadth
of criminal liability under Section 940.03 was State v. Chambers.192 In
Chambers, the court of appeals determined that a defendant could "be
held liable for felony-murder, party to a crime, where a defendant participates with an accomplice in a relevant underlying felony within [Section
940.03] and the accomplice kills a pursuing police officer during the commission of the felony."' 193 The court was faced with a novel situation in
Chambers. The defendant, Lavelle Chambers, and his friend, Eddie
Brooks, were driving in the City of Milwaukee intending to commit a
robbery. 194 As they drove past the North Avenue Smoke Shop, they
noticed two men pushing a safe away from the shop. 95 Chambers and
Brooks stopped the car; "accosted" the two men; learned that the men
had just broken into the shop and were stealing the safe; and finally, ran
into the shop and "stole various items-guns, money, and food
stamps."' 96 While in the shop, they heard on a police scanner that the
police had been dispatched to the break-in.' 97 They left the shop, noticed a squad car located near the shop, and ran. 1 98 They split up after a
short distance and Chambers hid under a porch.' 99 The police later
found Chambers and arrested him. At that point, Chambers learned
that Brooks had shot and killed a pursuing police officer.2° Chambers
192. 183 Wis. 2d 316, 515 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1994).
193. Id. at 325, 515 N.W.2d at 535.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 318-19, 515 N.W.2d at 532.
Id.
Id. at 319, 515 N.W.2d at 532.
Id.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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was charged and convicted of felony murder, party to a crime, 201 and
possession of a firearm by a felon.202
Chambers argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of felony murder, party to a crime, because after he and
Brooks left the shop, "they went in separate directions and had no further contact or communications.

' 20 3

The court of appeals concluded

that:
the general principles governing party to a crime liability under
§ 939.05 ...when applied to the language of the felony murder
statute, are most reasonably construed as holding all participants
in the underlying felony liable for any death that results from the
acts of20 4their co-conspirators during the commission of such
felony.

The court stated that it was adopting the reasoning of Prophet v. United
States,2 ° 5 a case from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that
declared there was "[n]o distinction ... between principals and aiders
and abettors for purposes of felony murder liability. 2 0 6 The Wisconsin

Court of Appeals thereby concluded that under Section 940.03 only the
defendant's intent to commit the underlying felony need be proved in
order to convict the defendant of a death caused by an accomplice. 2°0
The court stated that there was no requirement that the defendant, when
201. The supreme court in Oimen declared that it was improper to charge a defendant
with felony murder, as a party to a crime. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 320, 515 N.W.2d at 533.
204. Id. at 322-23, 515 N.W.2d at 534.
205. 602 A.2d 1807 (D.C. 1992).
206. Chambers, 183 Wis. 2d at 322-23, 515 N.W.2d at 534 (quoting Prophet, 602 A.2d at
1095). Prophet was discussing the proper jury instructions a trial court submits in cases of
accomplice liability for felony murder. Prophet, 602 A.2d at 1094. The D.C. trial court gave
the standard felony-murder instruction:
"Any killing, even committed... without the specific intent to kill, and even if accidental is murder in the first degree if committed in the perpetration or the attempt to
perpetrate the offense of robbery.
Now, if two or more persons acting together [are] perpetrating, or attempting to perpetrate the offense of robbery, and one of them in the course of the felony and in furtherance of the common purpose to commit the felony, kills a human being, both the
person who commits the killing, and the person or persons who aided and abetted the
felony are guilty of murder in the first degree.
Id. (quoting D.C. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCrIONs 4.22 (3d ed. 1978). The D.C. court concluded that it could not require a "natural and probable consequence" scheme for felony
murder, as urged by the defendant, because prior D.C. case law had previously declared that
such a connection was unnecessary. Id. at 1095.
207. Id.
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engaged in one of the felonies enumerated under Section 208940.03, intended to kill "or directly cause the death of a third party.
The court of appeals decision in Chambers was quickly followed by
two companion cases issued by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on June 7,
1994. These two cases, State v. Oimen and State v. Rivera, definitively
laid to rest most remaining questions surrounding the statutory construction of Section 940.03.
The supreme court decision in Qimen derived from a homicide committed in Monona, Wisconsin, only one day after Section 940.03 became
effective on January 1, 1989. Thus, the resulting prosecution was the first
to test the potentially sweeping language of the new statute.
The defendant, James Oimen, and two others, David Hall and Shawn
McGinnis, attempted to burglarize the home of Tom Stoker during the
late-night hours of January 2, 1989.209 Oimen remained in the pickup
truck while Hall and McGinnis cut the telephone cords to the house.210
Next, the two went to the back porch, with Hall carrying a broken pool
cue butt, a small billy club, and a pocket knife; McGinnis carried a BB
gun.211 Meanwhile, Stoker had been attempting to call his daughter
when the phone went dead.212 He placed a hunting rifle on his bed and
went to investigate, at which time he saw Hall and McGinnis-masked
and armed on his porch.213 McGinnis pointed the BB gun at Stoker and
' 214 Stoker ran to his bedyelled, "We want your money, you bookie.
215
room and grabbed and loaded his gun.
McGinnis broke open the door and Hall entered.21 6 Seeing Stoker
return with a rifle, Hall fled, but Stoker fired the rifle and killed McGinis.2 7 Oimen, who was still waiting in the pickup truck outside, drove
8
off.21
Oimen was later arrested, charged, and convicted of attempted
armed robbery, armed burglary, and felony murder, all as a party to a
crime.21 9 In a two to one, unpublished decision, the court of appeals
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Oinen, 184 Wis. 2d at 429, 516 N.W2d at 402.
Id. at 429, 516 N.W.2d at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430, 516 N.W.2d at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 431-33, 516 N.W.2d at 402-03.
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affirmed Oimen's judgment of conviction on all counts.2 2 0 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court accepted review of the case in order to clarify the language of Section 940.03.221
In a unanimous decision, the court concluded a defendant could "be
charged with felony murder for the death of a co-felon when the killing
was committed by the victim of the underlying felony."'222 The court
concluded that the "plain meaning" of Section 940.03 prescribed the
proof of only two elements before criminal liability would attach: (1)
that a defendant cause a death, and (2) that a defendant cause the death
while committing or attempting to commit one of the five enumerated
felonies. 2' 3
Further, the court concluded that Wisconsin criminal law prescribed
a consistent meaning to the definition of "causation," that is, that an
"actor causes death if his or her conduct is a 'substantial factor' in bring
Thus, the court stated that if a defendant's actions
about that result."'
factor
were a substantial 225 in causing a death, it was irrelevant as to whose
death was the result.
The court also stated that the legislative history of Section 940.03
supported the court's construction of the causation language. 226 After
tracing the history of the Special Committee's deliberations in a similar
manner to that set forth in Part III above, the court acknowledged that
while a majority of states had adopted the agency theory of felony-murder liability, the language and legislative history of Section 940.03 did
not evince an intent by the Wisconsin Legislature to "impose liability
only when there is an 'agency' relationship.""
The court stated that any harshness that resulted from the operation
of the felony-murder statute should be mitigated at sentencing; thus, the
sentencing court could take into consideration the fact that the person
killed was not an "innocent bystander" but was a participant in the underlying felony.'
220. Id. at 427, 516 N.W.2d at 401.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 428, 516 N.W.2d at 401.
223. 1L at 435, 516 N.W.2d at 404.
224. Id.
225. Id. The court did acknowledge that other states specifically limit felony-murder liability by the express language of their respective felony-murder statutes. Id. at 436 n.7, 516
N.W.2d at 404 n.7; see also supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text.
226. Id. at 437, 516 N.W.2d at 405.
227. Id. at 443-44, 516 N.W.2d at 407-08.
228. Id. at 444-45, 445 n.16, 516 N.W.2d at 408, 408 n.16.
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Finally, the court also concluded that the language "while committing
or attempting to commit" in Section 940.03 encompassed actions committed while in immediate flight from a felony. 2 9 Thus, if an action that
resulted in a death was sufficiently temporal to the attempted commission or commission of the underlying felony, felony-murder liability
could be
extended to all those who intended to commit the underlying
30
felony2
In one final aside, the court also noted that it was improper to charge
a defendant with felony murder, party to a crime- 3 1 "A person convicted of a felony as a party to a crime becomes principal to a murder
occurring as a result of that felony." 232 Accordingly, the court deterparty to a crime,
mined that to charge an individual with felony-murder,
23 3
unnecessary."
and
was both "redundant
In State v. Rivera, Oimen's companion case, the supreme court faced
a slightly different issue. On September 5, 1989, Elvin Rivera and three
accomplices went to the apartment of Robert and Julie Mayle.234 They
went to the apartment with the intention of stealing marijuana that they
believed the Mayles possessed.235 Rivera approached Brian Fruth, a
friend of the Mayles, as he left the apartment. 3 6 Rivera placed a gun to
Fruth's side, said, "Don't move or I'll kill you," and entered the apartment with Fruth and one of Rivera's associates.2 7
The Mayles, who were in their bedroom, heard their dogs snarling,
and Robert Mayle went to investigate?13 He saw Rivera in the kitchen
with a gun pointed at Fruth's head; he yelled for his wife to get her gun,
and ran back into the bedroom with Rivera following.3 9 Once inside
the bedroom Robert Mayle attempted to grab the gun from his wife and
it discharged. 24 Rivera heard the shot and attempted to flee the apart229. Id. at 447-48, 516 N.W.2d at 409-10. As the court noted, id. at 448 n.18, 516 N.W.2d
at 409 n.18, its conclusion regarding liability for deaths caused in the immediate flight or es-

cape from the underlying felony has been adopted by a majority of states.
230. This issue was not raised in Chambers where the defendant was held liable for the
killing of a police officer by the defendant's escaping accomplice to the underlying robbery.
231. Id. at 449, 516 N.W.2d at 410.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Rivera, 184 Wis. 2d at 487, 516 N.W.2d at 391.
235. Id.

236. Id. at 487-88, 516 N.W.2d at 392.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 488, 516 N.W.2d at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ment but Mayle fired several shots at Rivera and one shot struck and
killed Fruth.24"
Rivera was arrested, charged, and convicted before a bench trial for
felony murder.2 14 Rivera appealed his conviction and the supreme court
accepted certification of his appeal from the court of appeals.3 The
court, in a succinct opinion, stated that the outcome of the case was dictated by its conclusion in Oimen.24 Thus, it concluded that Rivera was
criminally liable for Fruth's death because Rivera's conduct in the attempted armed robbery was a substantial factor in causing Fruth's
death.24
While the decision in Rivera did not break significant new ground on
the issue of felony murder in Wisconsin beyond that already discussed in
Oimen, it further expanded the scope of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to charge a defendant with felony murder. In the wake
of Chambers, Oimen, and Rivera the scope of felony-murder situations
in Wisconsin now includes accomplice liability when: (1) another accomplice separated from the principle and escaping from the scene of a robbery kills a pursuing police officer; (2) an intended victim kills one of the
accomplices during an attempted robbery; and (3) an intended victim
kills an innocent bystander while defending against an attempted robbery. All three cases make a clear break with the historical development
of the felony-murder doctrine in Wisconsin. They also give Wisconsin
one of the more sweeping felony-murder statutes in the United States.'
This is an ironic result for a statute that has at its genesis a committee
that originally recommended the abolishment of the felony-murder doctrine. Thus, perhaps it is now time to again re-evaluate whether the felony-murder doctrine and the widened scope of Section 940.03, has a
place in Wisconsin's criminal code.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 487, 516 N.W.2d at 391.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. This, of course, refers only to the establishment of criminal liability. Because
§ 940.03 acts only as a penalty enhancer to the underlying felony, Wisconsin avoids the harshness that might have resulted if the Special Committee's "fall-back" plan of making felony
murder a Class A felony, had been adopted.
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IV.

FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF FELONY

MURDER IN WISCONSIN

Parts II and III of this Comment laid out a historical background for
the origination and development of the felony-murder doctrine in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions. While the history of a doctrine is necessary for a complete understanding of how and why a legal theory
developed, it fails to answer a more important question: Is the felonymurder doctrine a necessary part of the modem criminal code of Wisconsin? This question, after all, remains at the heart of nearly all of the
criticism that the doctrine has engendered in the last half-century. Accordingly, Part IV of this Comment will highlight the contemporary justifications for the continuation of felony murder as a viable component
of the substantive criminal law. Next, this Comment will address the
major criticism of the doctrine. In conclusion, this Comment suggests
that in the wake of Oimen and Rivera the legislature should once again
re-evaluate whether the doctrine has a place in Wisconsin's criminal law.
A. Modern Justificationsfor the Felony-Murder Doctrine
As other commentators have noted, the academic literature on felony murder is "voluminous."'2 4 7 Nearly all of this commentary is deroga-

tory to the doctrine, yet felony murder remains a part of nearly every
jurisdiction in the United States.2 48 While most of the recent literature
continues to be critical of felony murder, in the past decade several writers have posited modem justifications for the continuation of this much
maligned common-law doctrine. 249 These justifications attempt to provide a reasoned argument2 50 for supporters of the felony-murder doctrine beyond the popular belief that it would be politically impossible to
remove felony murder from criminal codes.251
247. Tort Law, supra note 25, at 1918 n.1.
248. Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 359-60.
249. See generally Kevin Cole, Killings DuringCrime Toward a DiscriminatingTheory of
Strict Liability, 28 AM. CGRIM. L. REv. 73 (1990); Crump & Crump, supra note 151; Tort Law,
supra note 25.

250. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 450.
251. See Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 360. When discussing why the felony-murder doctrine is retained in most jurisdictions, albeit under many limited constraints, the au-

thors state: "A cynic might attribute this phenomenon to misinformation, public hysteria,
electoral politics, or stodginess, but the number of courts and legislatures that have considered

the question and retained the doctrine prompts the speculation that public officials may know
something that scholars do not." Id. (citation omitted).
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One of the principal arguments many supporters of felony murder
252
propagate is that felony-murder statutes provide a deterrent effect.
This deterrence has two components. The first is to deter felonious actors from causing a death in the commission of the felony2 53 The second
is to provide a deterrence to the underlying felony itself by holding the
felonious actor responsible for any death that occurs in the commission
of that felony.254 This deterrence argument has come under much criticism, 2 5 particularly when discussing the vicarious liability of codefendants for the actions of the principal.5 6 One set of commentators noted:
The illogic of the felony-murder rule as a means of deterring killing is apparent when applied to accidental killings occurring during the commission of a felony. Quite simply, how does one deter
an unintended act? A similar deterrence problem arises when the
felony-murder rule is used to convict the defendant for murder
when a third party, such as the victim or a policeman, committed
the killing. The defendant has no control over the acts of the
third party and thus the rule cannot deter this sort of killing.
252. FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 297-98; Cole, supra note 206, at 78-96; Crump &
Crump, supra note 154, at 369-71; see also People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 135-36 (Cal.
1965) (Burke, J., dissenting) (criticizing the reversal of a felony-murder conviction by stating,
that "[o]bviously this advance judicial absolution removes one of the most meaningful deterrents to the commission of armed felonies." Id. at 136).
253. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 450.
254. Id. at 451. While this justification does have some adherents, it is, by and large, a
minority view. Id. at 451 n.28 (citing Note, The MergerDoctrine as a Limitation on the FelonyMurder Rule: A Balance of Criminal Law Principles, 13 WAK FoREST L. RFv. 369, 374
(1977)).
255. Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr. provided an early formation of this criticism: "If the object of the [felony-murder] rule is to prevent [accidental killings], it should make accidental
killing with firearms murder, not accidental killing in the effort to steal; while, if its object is to
prevent stealing, it would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot." HOLMES,
supra note 17, at 58. This statement by Holmes is often quoted. E.g., 2 LAFAVE & ScOTT,
supra note 16, at 232-33; Ludwig, supra note 16, at 62.
256. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982). The Supreme Court in Enmund
held that it was inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a defendant
convicted of felony murder when he did not "kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take
place or that lethal force will be employed." Id. at 797. The Court stated:
We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or
purpose that life will be taken. Instead, it seems likely that "capital punishment can
serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation,"
for if a person does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force will be
employed by others, the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious
felony murder will not "enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act."
Id. at 778-79 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
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Moreover, any potential deterrence effect on unintentional killings is further reduced because few felons either will know that
the felony-murder rule imposes strict liability for resulting deaths
or will25believe
that harm will result from commission of the
7
felony.

In the face of such criticism, deterrence remains as one of the "most
often recognized" policy rationales used by courts for the continuation
of the felony-murder doctrine. u s
Another justification for the modem acceptance of the felony-murder rule is that it "squares with societal perceptions of proportionalityof 'just deserts.' ,z Under this scheme, felony-murder statutes are justified because they reflect a judgment by society260 that "an intentionally
257. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 451-52 (citations omitted). Contra Crump &
Crump, supra note 154, at 370-71.
The argument against deterrence often proceeds on the additional assumption that felony murder is addressed only to accidental killings and cannot result in their deterrence. By facilitating proof and simplifying the concept of liability, however, felony
murder may deter intentional killings as well. The robber who kills intentionally, but
who might claim under oath to have acted accidentally, is thus told that he will be
deprived on the benefit of this claim. By institutionalizing this effect and consistently
condemning robbery-homicides as qualitatively more blameworthy than robberies, the
law leads the robber who kills intentionally to expect this treatment for himself... .The
proposition that accidental killings cannot be deterred is inconsistent with the widespread belief that the penalizing of negligence, and even the imposition of strict liability, may have deterrent consequences.
Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
258. Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 370 (citing People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793, 801
(Cal. 1971), and People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (N.Y. 1973)).
259. Id.
260. There are differing opinions on what constitutes societal views. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987),
was divided over what was the best expression of societal views in the case of capital punishment for felony murders. It viewed legislative enactments and jury sentencing decisions.
Compare Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-97 with Enmund, 458 U.S. at 818-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); compare also Tison, 481 U.S. at 146-48.
Crump and Crump reviewed a 1983 U.S. Justice Department report that surveyed public
attitudes on the seriousness of certain "legal events." Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at
363-64 (citing BuREAU OF JusTmcu STATISTICS OF THE U. S. DEP'T. OF JuSTICE, REPORT TO
TmE NAnON ON CRIME AND JuSTICE: TBE DATA 4-5 (1983)). The survey respondents classified "offenses" that were ostensibly felony-murders as more serious than some "intentional
killings." Id. at 364 n.18-21.
Finally, Finkel and Duff concluded from the results of their controlled experiment that
"mock jurors and mock justices overwhelmingly and consistently reject the accessorial liability
theory [for felony-murders]." Norman J. Finkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony-Murder and Community Sentiment: Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, 15 L. & HUM. BE-Av. 405, 427
(1991). "It is also clear from [the experiment's results] that a majority of the subjects nullify
the conclusive presumption of the felony-murder rule when we sum across defendants and
cases." Id.
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committed robbery that causes the death of a human being is qualitatively more serious than an identical robbery that does not."'261 To some,
this classification system is a necessary extension of the deterrence objective.262 Because felony murder is a greater crime in society's view
than just the underlying felony, the punishment must also be greater to
reflect society's indignation and to provide greater deterrence to this
crime.263 It also reinforces the "reverence [society has] for human life"
by condemning crimes that cause human death.26
This justification is also closely tied to the societal goal of retribution.
Under this basis, felons exhibit "evil minds" when they attempt or commit the underlying felony and, therefore, any death that results deserves
greater punishment because of the greater harm caused.2 65 This justification, according to some commentators, is a remnant of a "harm-oriented" approach of the early common law, rather than the contemporary
"act-oriented" approach that focuses on the defendant's culpability for
the underlying act.2 66
While these are not the only justifications that supporters of the felony-murder rule posit in defense of the doctrine, they remain the most
prominent.267 As stated above, the academic support for felony murder
is dwarfed in comparison to the reproach that commentators have
draped on the doctrine. Hence, the next section will discuss the major
criticism of the doctrine that these commentators have produced in favor
of their call for the elimination of the felony-murder rule.
261. Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 363.
262. Cole, supra note 249, at 87. Cole postulated:
Just as a consequentialist punishment strategy might distinguish between premeditated
and unpremeditated murders, a consequentialist punishment strategy also justifies distinguishing between felony murders and simple murders. That is because we can plausibly predict that potential felony murderers, viewed as a class, will require more
punishment to deter them from crime than will potential simple murderers.
Id.
263. Id.
264. Crump & Crump, supra note 154, at 368. "Condemnation itself is a multifaceted
idea. It embodies the notion of reinforcement of societal norms and values as a guide to the
conduct of upright persons, as opposed to less upright ones who presumably require the separate prod of 'deterrence.'" Id. at 367.
265. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 457-58.
266. FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 284-85; Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 458 n.68.
267. Authors Crump and Crump gave several other justifications for the modem application of the felony-murder rule beyond those already discussed: "Clear and Unambiguous
Definition of Offenses and Sentence Consequences," "Optimal Allocation of Criminal Justice
Resources," and "Minimization of the Utility of Perjury." Crump & Crump, supra note 154,
at 371-76.
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B.

The Major Criticism of the Modem Felony-MurderRule

The predominant criticism of the felony-murder doctrine today remains the troubling concept of holding a person criminally liable for a
result without requiring a corresponding level of mental culpability for
the result.26 According to critics of the felony-murder doctrine, it is
askew with modem conceptions of proportionality-that someone
should be severely punished for the unintended results of their
actions.2 69

The United States Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is fundamental
that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than
causing the same harm unintentionally.' "270 The felony-murder rule violates this principle most dramatically in states, unlike Wisconsin, that
categorize felony murder as first-degree murder.271 In such a classification, the mental culpability for an unintended or accidental death is
raised to the same level as that as a calculated, premeditated homicide.272 Critics contend that felony murder is no more than a "living
fossil" 273 of a criminal justice system that did not distinguish criminal
behavior on the basis of mental culpability.274

The above brief discussion in no way addresses the range of the modem criticisms of felony murder, but it does provide a platform from
268. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316-17 (Mich. 1980). The Michigan Supreme
Court stated:
"If one had to choose the most basic principle of the criminal law in general... it
would be that criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the
absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result. .. ."
The most fundamental characteristic of the felony-murder rule violates this basic
principle in that it punishes all homicides, committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of proscribed felonies whether intentional, unintentional or accidental,
without the necessity of proving the relation between the homicide and the perpetrator's state of mind.
Id. (quoting Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y. L. FoRUM 565, 586 (1966)).

269. 2 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 16, at 232. "Yet it is a general principle of criminal
law that one is not ordinarily criminally liable for bad results which differ greatly from intended results." Id Fletcher states: "Punishment must be proportional to wrongdoing. When
the felony-murder rule converts an accidental death into first-degree murder, then punishment is rendered disproportionate to the wrong for which the offender is personally responsible." Fletcher, supra note 15, at 428.
270. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting H. HART, PUNIsHMENT AND
RESPONSmILrry 162 (1968)).

271.
272.
273.
274.

Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 317.
Id.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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which one can analyze the continued need for the felony-murder statute
in Wisconsin. Accordingly, the next section places Wisconsin Statutes
Section 940.03 under just such a critical examination.
C. Is It Time to Re-Evaluate Felony Murder in Wisconsin Again?
As chronicled above, the call for the elimination of the felony-murder doctrine in Wisconsin is not a new concept.275 In the past forty
years, three recommendations to repeal the statute have failed.276 On
their face, such efforts would have appeared to have the great weight of
academic and judicial backing for their success. Yet each time, bowing
to perceived public pressure, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted a more
restricted construction of felony murder instead of abolishing this antiquated common-law doctrine.277 In the wake of Oimen and Rivera, however, the doctrine has been granted a broader scope of potential liability
than at any other time in modem Wisconsin history.
Accordingly, it is time once again for the legislature to consider
whether the felony-murder doctrine has a place in the Wisconsin substantive criminal code. The Special Committee was nearly uniform in its
original recommendation to repeal the felony-murder statute.278 In its
attempt to clarify the Wisconsin Homicide Code, the Special Committee
realized that there was no longer a need for the doctrine because nearly
every conceivable type of homicide would be chargeable under another
provision of the new homicide code.279 While there may exist some situations that could slip through the cracks of the current scheme, these
situations are most likely to violate the proportionality principle so fundamental to the modem ideals of criminal law.2"
While one must acknowledge that the scheme under Section 940.03
does not violate the proportionality principle as egregiously as do statutes in other jurisdictions that make felony murder a capital offense or
equal to premeditated homicide-the scheme remains an awkward
anomaly under the overall concepts of the Wisconsin Criminal Code.
The Wisconsin Legislature acknowledged the need for proportionality
when it rebuffed the Special Committee's back-up recommendation to
275. See supra notes 53-61, 115-48 and accompanying text.
276. Id.
277. See supra note 143.
278. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
279. Summary of Proceedings for Judicial Council Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses Committee 24-25 (Nov. 11, 1982) (unpublished, on file in HOMICiDE REviSiON, supra
note 6).
280. See supra notes 24, 259-64 and accompanying text.
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make Section 940.03 a Class A felony.2 1 The penalty for this proposed
version of the felony-murder statute was considered too harsh when
compared to the entire punishment scheme.3
As in many other jurisdictions, the Wisconsin Legislature has chosen
to mitigate the harsh effects of the original common-law felony-murder
rule. For the majority of the history of the doctrine in Wisconsin this
mitigation was accomplished in one manner: The causal connection between the underlying felony and the death had to be sufficiently close so
that one could impute the intent from the felony to the death. The Special Committee broke from this tradition and instead limited the operation of the felony-murder rule to a specified set of felonies. None of
these restraints resolves the underlying problem of the rule. "Such
patchwork attempts to mitigate the rule's harshness, however, have been
legitimately criticized because they do not resolve [the rule's] essential
illogic. Limiting the scope of the rule's operation, for instance, merely
convicted under the rule are
increases the probability that defendants
283
guilty of some form of homicide.
The political pressure to retain felony murder most likely surrounds
fears that without such a statute felons who kill will not be held responsible for their actions. 28 But as can be seen, it is only in the most bizarre
or tenuous situations that a felon will not be prosecutable under other
provisions of the homicide code. 28 In these bizarre situations the public
most often rejects the operation of the felony-murder rule anyway.2 6
For these reasons, the continued validity of the felony-murder statute
must be questioned. If the only reason to retain Section
Wisconsin
in
940.03 is such unfounded political fears, it is logical that the doctrine no
longer has a legitimate place in Wisconsin law.287
281. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
282. Id.

283. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 446-47 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2
commentary at 36 (Official Draft 1980)).
284. See supra note 143.
285. Id.

286. See Finkel & Duff, supra note 260, at 427.
287. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded, when it abolished the felony-murder doc-

trine in 1980, that:
Whatever reasons can be gleaned from the dubious origin of the felony-murder rule
to explain its existence, those reasons no longer exist today. Indeed, most states, including our own, have recognized the harshness and inequity of the rule as is evidenced

by the numerous restrictions placed on it. The felony-murder doctrine is unnecessary
and in many cases unjust in that it violates the basic premise of individual moral culpability upon which our criminal law is based.
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328 (Mich. 1980).
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CONCLUSION

This Comment has attempted to discuss many of the issues surrounding Wisconsin's revised felony-murder statute. While attempting to clarify the homicide code in 1988, the Judicial Council's Special Committee
on Homicide and Lesser-Included Offenses actually laid the ground
work to alter how the felony-murder doctrine operated in the state. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court completed this change with its decisions in
Oimen and Rivera. One can now view a clear break with the historical
development of the doctrine in Wisconsin. This break with history
should reinvigorate the doctrine's critics to ask the legislature once
more: Why does felony murder have a place in the modem Wisconsin
criminal code?
MICHAEL J. ROMAN

